FINANCIAL DOLLARIZATION: Evaluating the consequences

Financial dollarization has been placed at the forefront of the policy debate in many developing economies, for reasons that include its influence on inflation performance and, most prominently, the currency imbalance and associated financial fragility that it introduces for the economy as a whole. This paper contributes to this debate by revisiting the evidence on the impact of FD on inflation, financial fragility and economic performance in light of a new updated database. It finds evidence that financially dollarized economies tend to display higher inflation rates, higher propensity to suffer banking crises and slower and more volatile output growth, without significant gains in terms of domestic financial depthdollarization

Financial Dollarisation: Evaluating The Consequences

Financial dollarisation, defined as the holding by residents of foreign currency assets and liabilities, has been placed at the forefront of the policy debate in developing economies. The reasons include its alleged influence on the conduct of monetary policy and, most prominently, the deleterious impact of exchange rate depreciations on the solvency of dollar debtors (the balance sheet effect). However, the vast analytical literature on these issues contrasts with the scarcity of empirical work to support or refute these implications. This paper contributes to fill this gap. Using a new updated database, the paper revisits the evidence on the determinants of financial dollarisation, and tests whether the impact on monetary and financial stability, and economic performance predicted by the theory is verified in the data. It finds that financially dollarised economies display a more unstable demand for money, a greater propensity to suffer banking crises after a depreciation of the local currency, and slower and more volatile output growth, without significant gains in terms of domestic financial depth. In this light, the case for an active de-dollarisation policy is discussed.

Recurrent Debt Problems and International Safety Nets

In this paper, I revisit the moral hazard arguments in order to discuss alternative approaches to the role of the IFIs. In particular, I distinguish between lender, borrower and government moral hazard, according to how the costs and benefits of IFI intervention are distributed among the relevant players, and argue that it is the latter problem that should be at the center of the debate. In this light, I analyze the consequences of alternative modus operandi of the IFIs. I conclude that both casual evidence and economic analysis suggest that an explicit international safety net, by enhancing the expected returns of good policies as perceived by the government, may create the right incentives outweighing hazard considerations and, as a result, may help reduce the incidence of recurrent debt problems.

CATalytic insurance : the case of natural disasters

Why should countries buy expensive catastrophe insurance? Abstracting from risk aversion or hedging motives, this paper shows that catastrophe insurance may have a catalytic role on external finance. Such effect is particularly strong in those middle-income countries that face financial constraints when hit by a shock or in its anticipation. Insurance makes defaults less appealing, relaxes countries'borrowing constraint, increases their creditworthiness, and enhances their access to capital markets. Catastrophe lending facilities providing"cheap"reconstruction funds in the aftermath of a natural disaster weaken but do not eliminate the demand for insurance.Debt Markets,Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress,Labor Policies,Emerging Markets,Financial Intermediation

Country Insurance

The recent wave of financial crises has fueled the debate on the effect of IFIs intervention on governments' incentives to undertake reforms. In this paper we treat this intervention more generally as a country insurance contract, and examine its implications in a stylized set-up. More precisely, we identify the conditions under which the positive insurance effect dominates moral hazard considerations, and the channels through which this is achieved. In particular, we find that the case for country insurance is stronger for crisis-prone volatile economies, especially so if assistance is made contingent on the occurrence of adverse external macroeconomic shocks. Overall, our findings argue in favor of fairly-priced country insurance or insurance-type standing credit facilities that can be factored in ex ante by the borrowing government, as opposed to the customized discretionary bailoutsFinancial Crises, Bailouts, Moral Hazard, Insurance Effect,

The Elusive Costs of Sovereign Defaults

Few would dispute that sovereign defaults entail significant economic costs, including, most notably, important output losses. However, most of the evidence supporting this conventional wisdom, based on annual observations, suffers from serious measurement and identification problems. To address these drawbacks, we examine the impact of default on growth by looking at quarterly data for emerging economies. We find that, contrary to what is typically assumed, output contractions precede defaults. Moreover, we find that the trough of the contraction coincides with the quarter of default, and that output starts to grow thereafter, indicating that default episode seems to mark the beginning of the economic recovery rather than a further decline. This suggests that, whatever negative effects a default may have on output, those effects result from anticipation of a default rather than the default itself.

Concentración y penetración foránea en los sectores bancarios latinoamericanos: repercusiones sobre la competencia y el riesgo

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) En los últimos años, los sectores bancarios latinoamericanos han experimentado un acelerado proceso de concentración y penetración foránea, lo cual ha suscitado diversos puntos de vista en cuanto a sus implicaciones para la conducta competitiva de los bancos y para la estabilidad financiera del sistema como un todo. Empleamos una base de datos de balances generales bancarios de ocho países latinoamericanos con abundante información para analizar la evolución de los indicadores de la concentración y la penetración foránea, así como sus efectos sobre la competencia y el riesgo. Hallamos que, aunque la concentración no hizo disminuir la competencia en la actividad bancaria, puede que la penetración foránea sí haya conducido a una disminución de la competitividad del sector bancario. Además, hallamos que la fragilidad del sector bancario parece guardar una relación positiva con la competencia y, por este canal, una relación negativa con la participación extranjera, pese al hecho de que se vincula a los bancos extranjeros que operan en la región con un mayor riesgo de insolvencia, debido a proporciones de endeudamiento más elevadas y rendimientos más inestables.

Country Insurance

In this paper, we examine how country insurance schemes affect policymakers' incentives to undertake reforms. Such schemes (especially when made contingent on negative external shocks) are more likely to foster than to delay reform in crisis-prone volatile economies. The consequences of country insurance, however, hinge on the nature of the reforms being considered: "buffering" reforms, aimed at mitigating the cost of crises, could be partially substituted for, and ultimately discouraged by, insurance. By contrast, "enhancing" reforms that pay more generously in the absence of a crisis are likely to be promoted. Copyright 2005, International Monetary Fund

Zooming in : from aggregate volatility to income distribution

In contrast with a growing literature on the drivers of aggregate volatility in developing countries, its consequences in terms of individual incomes have received less attention. This paper looks at the impact of cyclical output fluctuations and extreme output events (crises) on unemployment, poverty, and inequality. The authors find robust evidence that aggregate volatility has a regressive, asymmetric, and non linear impact, as reflected in the strong influence of extreme output drops. The findings show that, in addition to the mitigating role of personal wealth, public expenditure and labor protection exert a similar benign effect. These findings are in line with the income substitutions view of social safety nets, and cast a new light on the value of social programs and labor market regulation in crisis prone developing countries.Economic Conditions and Volatility,Emerging Markets,Economic Theory&Research,Inequality,